[15] A final attack force of Japanese torpedo bombers failed to find the remaining U.S. And all the Allied ships were significantly less alert than the Japanese. Basically he pretended he was on patrol near Australia, not the forward element of a fleet located in enemy waters. As fo0r the Hudson’s report it has now been established that identification had been made of “three cruisers, three destroyers and two seaplane tenders or gunboats”. Bode's actions during the engagement were questioned in an inquiry headed by Admiral Arthur Japy Hepburn. The Naval Officer in Charge of Sydney, Rear Admiral Muirhead-Gould had been hosting a dinner at his official residence ‘Tresco’, attended by Captain H. D Bode, commanding officer of the USS Chicago, as sketchy details began to emerge of events on the harbour. Admiral Hepburn did a thorough investigation and came to the conclusion Bode deserves censure. And he never warned any other Allied ship (or his commanding officers) that the Japanese were in the strait. Chicago then lost sight of the enemy ship and was left without an enemy to pursue. Communications failures are the bug-a-boo of many snafu’s. A second torpedo hit but failed to explode, and a shell hit the cruiser's mainmast, killing two crewmen. Bode also had priors- he was a martinet - disliked by his officers and had accused them of being drunk during the midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour. Starting with the Hudsons performing air recon. Shortly afterwards, the presence of the submarine was confirmed. As a result, tactical command of the Southern Group fell to Captain Howard Bode, CO of Chicago, which was in trail behind HMAS Canberra. Chicago did not get to fire her 203mm guns either, when she began a … Bode. There were communications failures all over the place, both strategic, and tactical. He took no action to inform the other captains. He didn’t fire his guns until the Japanese had moved on. Bode in comparison went to his cabin. Originally CL-29, effective 1 July 1931, Chicago was redesignated CA-29 in accordance with the provisions of the London Naval Treatyof 1930. They significantly missidentified the Japanese strike force (they underestimated it’s strength). The footnote provided for the source is pg 105-106 of Richard B. Franks excellent Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. As it did so, both Chicago and Canberra were illuminated by aerial flares. In Neptune’s Inferno, it reports that Captain Bode of the USS Chicago took the blame during a Navy review for the defeat at Savo during the Guadacanal campaign. More significantly, Bode made no attempt to warn any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship headed away from the battle area. He took his life as a result. At 1:47, as Captain Howard Bode was attempting to get Chicago into the fight, the ship was hit in the bow by a torpedo. One captain, Howard Bode of the USS Chicago, ordered his ship's radar turned off, for fear it would reveal his position. were approaching? He wasn’t the only one, there was more than enough blame to go around and the case could be made that he was becoming the designated scapegoat for the disaster since he was the only one going to be officially censured by the Board of Inquiry, his performance wasn’t very inspiring and he certainly bore some of the burden for the defeat. 1 #277 McPherson. [5], After a shakedown cruise to Honolulu, Tahiti and American Samoa, Chicago departed Mare Island on 27 July 1931 and sailed to the east coast, arriving at Fort Pond Bay, New York, on 16 August. [6] At the time of the incident damage was estimated to be around $200,000 ($3.95 million today). Looking back at this thread one thing I notice was never explicitly mentioned was that in addition to all his other failures in turning tail with the Chicago and running away sailing west for 40 minutes he was leaving behind the transports he was assigned to protect. Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the southern force, of which he was still technically in command. One became entangled in an anti-submarine boom net, and two were able to pass through. He only allowed one sweep from his fire control radar every half an hour. When he received command. Chicago took a couple of hits… and ran away. Chicago received three battle stars. While others certainly deserve a share of the blame. Aerial reconnaissance coming within a mile of properly identifying what they spotted was an extremely rare event. 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