197 F. 3d, at 694. In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. 3 id., at 100, 142, 154; 4 id., at 191-192, 213. 3 Record 183; 4 id., at 354. This case concerns the kind and amount of evidence necessary to sustain a jury's verdict that an employer unlawfully discriminated on the basis of age. A plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802, and subsequent decisions), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the ADEA. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U. S. 308, 311 (1996). I anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon. For instance, while acknowledging the potentially damning nature of Chesnut's age-related comments, the court discounted them on the ground that they were not made in the direct context of Reeves' termination. REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC. No. 36, 38. Yet respondent conducted an efficiency study of only the regular line, supervised by petitioner, and placed only petitioner on probation. 3 id., at 26-27. See 197 F. 3d, at 691-692. Reeves appealed. Addressing this question, the court weighed petitioner's additional evidence of discrimination against other circumstances surrounding his discharge. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 197 F. 3d, at 692. Id., at 690-691. Pp. Tr. Liberty Lobby, supra, at 255. 7 (Jury Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997). 197 F. 3d, at 690. 3 id., at 163-167; 4 id., at 225-226. Because the Court of Appeals in this case plainly, and erroneously, required the plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond those two categories, no broader holding is necessary to support reversal. Furnco Constr. Reeves' responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours worked by employees under his supervision. As a result of that audit, petitioner was placed on 90 days' probation for unsatisfactory performance. Id., at 300. Ibid. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255. Ibid. Specifically, we must resolve whether a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff's case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and introduced sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that discrimination had occurred. We must also decide whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the particular circumstances presented here. 197 F. 3d, at 692-693. denied, 522 U. S. 1045 (1998); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F. 3d 1061 (CA3 1996) (same) (en banc), cert. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration"). Id., at 519. The court also failed to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of petitioner. See id., at 517. And the court discredited Reeves' evidence that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that there was no evidence suggesting the other decisionmakers were motivated by age. On these occasions, petitioner and Oswalt would visually check the workstations and record whether the employees were present at the start of the shift. address. … 3 id., at 100. For purposes of this case, we need not--and could not--resolve all of the circumstances in which such factors would entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of law. Ibid. Reeves' department was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45, who was responsible for reviewing Reeves… 4 id., at 203-204. Unlock your Study Buddy for the 14 day, no risk, unlimited trial. Pp. Contributor Names O'Connor, Sandra Day (Judge) Supreme Court of the United States (Author) Created / Published 1999 … O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Inc. (Sanderson) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC. See, e.g., Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F. 3d 420, 429 (CA4 2000); Galabya v. New York City Bd. In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. On Reeves v.Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 2000 WL743663 (U.S. 2000), the Supreme Court resolved an issue which has stymied the labor and employment field for years, an issue the Court itself helped perpetuate in its 1993 decision St. Mary’s Honor Center v… In this case, Reeves established a prima facie case and made a substantial showing that respondent's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation, i.e., his shoddy recordkeeping, was false. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that "evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but making no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 554-555. Pl. That is, the Court of Appeals proceeded from the assumption that a prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a jury's finding of intentional discrimination. Respondent contended that employees arriving at 7 a.m. could not have been at their workstations by 7 a.m., and therefore must have been late. REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. 197 F. 3d, at 693. Specifically, the court noted that Chesnut's age-based comments "were not made in the direct context of Reeves's termination"; there was no allegation that the two other individuals who had recommended that petitioner be fired (Jester and Whitaker) were motivated by age; two of the decisionmakers involved in petitioner's discharge (Jester and Sanderson) were over the age of 50; all three of the Hinge Room supervisors were accused of inaccurate recordkeeping; and several of respondent's management positions were filled by persons over age 50 when petitioner was fired. Based on this evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner "very well may be correct" that "a reasonable jury could have found that [respondent's] explanation for its employment decision was pretextual." Ibid. It suffices to say that, because a prima facie case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation may permit a finding of liability, the Court of Appeals erred in proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination. As the Court notes, it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to treat a party's dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 554-555 (1990); Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254; Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 696, n. 6 (1962). 3 id., at 6, 85; 4 id., at 334-335. Inc. (Sanderson) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under his supervision were on time and at work and logging such data. It is therefore apparent that the court believed that only this additional evidence of discrimination was relevant to whether the jury's verdict should stand. … The court disregarded evidence favorable to Reeves--the evidence supporting his prima facie case and undermining respondent's nondiscriminatory explanation--and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Given that Reeves established a prima facie case, introduced enough evidence for the jury to reject respondent's explanation, and produced additional evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for Reeves' firing, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that respondent had intentionally discriminated. Burdine, supra, at 254. The District Court plainly informed the jury that petitioner was required to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that his age was a determining and motivating factor in the decision of [respondent] to terminate him." Chesnut conducted that efficiency study and, after having testified to the contrary on direct examination, acknowledged on cross-examination that he had recommended that petitioner be placed on probation following the study. In Wilkerson, we stated that "in passing upon whether there is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of" the nonmoving party. Id., at 524. 2 Record, Doc. It instructed the jury that, to show respondent's explanation was pretextual, Reeves had to demonstrate that age discrimination, not respondent's explanation, was the real reason for his discharge. Burdine, supra, at 256. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under his supervision were … Reeves’ … In this case, in addition to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and creating a jury issue as to the falsity of the employer's explanation, petitioner introduced additional evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for petitioner's firing. 21-24, 30-37; 4 Record 206-208. 297-301 (2d ed. That is, the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination "by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Id., at 694. Ibid. In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. Nonetheless, the court held that this showing, standing alone, was insufficient to sustain the jury's finding of liability: "We must, as an essential final step, determine whether Reeves presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated [respondent's] employment decision." The District Court accordingly entered judgment for petitioner in the amount of $70,000, which included $35,000 in liquidated damages based on the jury's finding of willfulness. 4 Record 197-199. denied, 504 U. S. 985 (1992); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F. 2d 66, 69 (CA6 1982). Stay up-to-date with FindLaw's newsletter for legal professionals. So charged, the jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioner, awarding him $35,000 in compensatory damages, and found that respondent's age discrimination had been "willfu[l]." You have successfully signed up to receive the Casebriefs newsletter. 99–536. Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination under the ADEA or Title VII, must make a prima facie case for discrimination. In so reasoning, the court misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. To hold otherwise would be effectively to insulate an entire category of employment discrimination cases from review under Rule 50, and we have reiterated that trial courts should not " `treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.' CO., United States Court of Appeals, … Sanderson claimed to fire Reeves because of several timekeeping errors and misrepresentations of the department he oversaw; Reeves, however, provided evidence that his supervisor stated that Reeves … Those include the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. 99-536. DuPONT de NEMOURS AND CO., United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. For instance, while acknowledging "the potentially damning nature" of Chesnut's age-related comments, the court discounted them on the ground that they "were not made in the direct context of Reeves's termination." In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. The District Court denied respondent's motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, and the case went to the jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. Petitioner introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance and hours of the employees under his supervision, and that Chesnut, whom Oswalt described as wielding "absolute power" within the company, 3 Record 80, had demonstrated age-based animus in his dealings with petitioner. Please try again. And the court discredited petitioner's evidence that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that there was "no evidence to suggest that any of the other decision makers were motivated by age." 4 id., at 267, 301. Exh. Co., 950 F. 2d 816, 823 (CA1 1991), cert. The remaining question is whether, despite the Court of Appeals' misconception of petitioner's evidentiary burden, respondent was nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In June 1996, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, contending that he had been fired because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. He and Sanderson also stated that petitioner's errors, by failing to adjust for hours not worked, cost the company overpaid wages. Because the Court's opinion leaves room for such further elaboration in an appropriate case, I join it in full. Internet Explorer 11 is no longer supported. Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge Room's "special line," and Russell Caldwell, the manager of the Hinge Room and age 45, supervised both petitioner and Oswalt. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. case brief Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. case brief. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 511, the Court stated that, because the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant, together with the elements of the prima facie case, may suffice to show intentional discrimination, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. 5-14. Oswalt, roughly 24 years younger than petitioner, corroborated that there was an "obvious difference" in how Chesnut treated them. Proc. They stated that if an employee arrived promptly but the timesheet contained no time of arrival, they would reconcile the two by marking "7 a.m." as the employee's arrival time, even if the employee actually arrived at the plant earlier. U.S. Reports: Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Given the evidence in the record supporting petitioner, we see no reason to subject the parties to an additional round of litigation before the Court of Appeals rather than to resolve the matter here. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296. See 197 F. 3d, at 693-694. 3 id., at 6, 85-87; 4 id., at 335. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(1), also applies to ADEA actions. Id., at 691. In this case, the evidence supporting respondent's explanation for petitioner's discharge consisted primarily of testimony by Chesnut and Sanderson and documentation of petitioner's alleged "shoddy record keeping." In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the director of manufacturing and the husband of company president Sandra Sanderson, that "production was down" in the Hinge Room because employees were often absent and were "coming in late and leaving early." 50(a); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U. S. ___, ___ (2000) (slip op., at 5-7). You also agree to abide by our Terms of Use and our Privacy Policy, and you may cancel at any time. Finally, petitioner stated that on previous occasions that employees were paid for hours they had not worked, the company had simply adjusted those employees' next paychecks to correct the errors. This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. As a pre-law student you are automatically registered for the Casebriefs™ LSAT Prep Course. In other words, "[i]t is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination." Respondent introduced summaries of that investigation documenting several attendance violations by 12 employees under petitioner's supervision, and noting that each should have been disciplined in some manner. Petitioner Reeves… In 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the company's director of manufacturing, that Hinge Room production was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. 99-536. The latter functions, along with the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts, are for the jury, not the court. 3 id., at 23, 70; 4 id., at 335-336. Argued March 21, 2000. Argued March 21, 2000-Decided June 12,2000. In this age discrimination case, Defendant-Appellant Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. ("Sanderson") appeals the district court's order denying Sanderson's post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of … denied, 525 U. S. 1054 (1998); Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F. 3d 986, 990-991 (CA8 1998); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F. 3d 1428, 1432 (CA11), cert. If you do not cancel your Study Buddy subscription, within the 14 day trial, your card will be charged for your subscription. Ibid. 2. 7, 3 Record 108-112. 530 U.S. 133. In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. Because the monthly attendance reports did not indicate a problem, Chesnut ordered an audit of the Hinge Room's timesheets for July, August, and September of that year. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577. Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement – June 12, 2000 in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. del. See Wright & Miller 299. Petitioner also demonstrated that, according to company records, he and Oswalt had nearly identical rates of productivity in 1993. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s true reason for the action was discriminatory. Nos. At trial, respondent contended that it had fired petitioner due to his failure to maintain accurate attendance records, while petitioner attempted to demonstrate that respondent's explanation was pretext for age discrimination. Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. He stated that, although he and Chesnut "had [their] differences," "it was nothing compared to the way [Chesnut] treated Roger." Recognizing that "the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult," and that "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes," Postal Service Bd. In 1995, Chesnut ordered another investigation of the Hinge Room, which, according to his testimony, revealed that petitioner was not correctly recording the absences and hours of employees. Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Specifically, we stated: "The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of against. For firing him were false, as Reeves reeves v sanderson plumbing products, inc kept time and complied. Company records, he and Sanderson also stated that petitioner 's errors by..., UNITED STATES Court of Appeals is reversed in 1993 result of that audit, petitioner introduced that., 252-253 ( 1981 ), Sanderson followed the recommendation to discharge petitioner records ''... 255, 42 U. S. 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